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Abstract 
In order to elucidate the working mechanism behind anthropomorphism, this study aimed to 
investigate whether a robot would be anthropomorphized more if a human and a robot moved 
synchronously, compared to nonsynchronously. It was hypothesized that moving in synchrony would 
lead to anthropomorphization via increased perceived feature overlap, which in turn would activate 
features related to humans via pattern completion. To study this, we performed a study with 
synchronicity as within-subjects factor, and initiator (robot or human) as between-subjects factor. 
Participants rated the robot on two state and one trait anthropomorphism questionnaire, and performed 
a joint Simon task and one-shot Dictator game with the robot. The results overall did not confirm our 
hypotheses. The results from the questionnaires showed that, particularly for the group in which the 
human initiated the movements, the robot was anthropomorphized more after nonsynchronous, 
compared to synchronous interaction. For the Dictator Game, those in the human initiator group gave 
the robot more money than those in the robot initiator group. This effect did not depend on 
synchronicity. Finally, the joint Simon effect was subject to an interaction between initiator and 
synchronicity. Those in the robot initiator group showed a larger joint Simon effect in the 
nonsynchronous condition compared to the synchronous condition.  
 
 
Anthropomorphism is commonly defined as the attribution of human mental states and characteristics 
to non-human animals and objects. There are two components to anthropomorphization: attributing 
human physical features to non-human animals and objects (e.g. seeing a face in the clouds), and 
attributing a human mind to non-human animals and objects (Waytz, Cacioppo & Epley, 2010). This 
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human mind encompasses not only emotions (e.g. my cat is grumpy), but also higher-order capacities 
such as intentions, desires, self-reflection, consciousness, and agency.  
Epley, Waytz, and Cacioppo (2007) have proposed a three-factor theory that combines 
sociality motivation, effectance motivation, and elicited agent knowledge to explain what might make 
people more or less inclined to anthropomorphize in the sense of attributing a human mind to non-
human animals and objects.  
The first factor is sociality motivation, which entails the drive to establish and maintain social 
relationships. People with high sociality motivation are argued to have an increased tendency to search 
for social connection, and are therefore more likely to anthropomorphize.  
The second factor is effectance motivation, which entails the drive to interact effectively with 
the environment through understanding, predicting, and controlling it. In novel or unfamiliar 
environments and situations, uncertainty can be reduced through anthropomorphization; as we’re quite 
familiar with humans we know how to deal with human-like things.  
The third and final factor is elicited agent knowledge, which entails using oneself as a 
reference to predict others’ behavior, and is proposed to be many people’s default mode. Correcting 
the default mode requires resources and motivation, so when these are low people tend to 
anthropomorphize.  
Although this is a good account of the determinants of anthropomorphization, it does not tell 
us anything about the cognitive mechanisms through which variance occurs in anthropomorphization 
between and within people. Building on previous work, we propose a new theory of the mechanism 
behind anthropomorphization. 
 
The proposed mechanism 
The proposed account is set in the Theory of Event Coding, TEC (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, 
& Prinz, 2001). Central to this theory of action and perception are the common coding principle and 
action concept model. The common coding principle entails that largely the same neurons are used to 
represent perception and action features (Prinz, 1990). Thus, watching someone ride a bike involves 
neural activation that is very similar to that elicited by actually riding a bike. These feature 
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representations, and any other action-related information, combine to form a highly flexible action 
concept, which is distributed over various brain regions (Hommel, 1997). Activation of features 
follows pattern-completion logic: if one of the features is activated, activation will spread through the 
rest of the related network, as long as the network is well established by frequent activation. So if you 
see a bike wheel, the feature bike wheel will be activated, then pattern completion will lead to the 
activation of bike, and perhaps to my bike, my bike shed and my flat tire needs to be fixed.  
 Not all features are equally important at any time. When trying to find a person in a crowd, his 
hair color and clothes are important features, whereas when the same person is an opponent in a game 
of poker, the subtleties in his facial expression are more salient. TEC accounts for this through 
intentional weighting (Memelink & Hommel, 2013). The goal determines which features are 
important, so task-relevant features determine the weights assigned to each feature. In the Simon task, 
for example, the fact that the instructions are to respond by left or right keypresses results in a higher 
weight for the spatial dimension. Given that the target stimuli also vary in this dimension, even though 
this is irrelevant to the correct response, the increased weight for spatial information makes the target’s 
location interfere with action processing.  
 In addition, features may overlap: the neural code for a certain feature may be part of two or 
more different networks (Hommel, 2009). This means that events can be both compared and confused 
based on the number of features they have in common. To give an example, one is more likely to 
confuse the holiday plans of two co-workers who are very similar from one’s perspective, compared to 
those of two co-workers who are very distinct. To elaborate on the Simon task example, the reason the 
increased weight for spatial information interferes with action processing, is that there is feature 
overlap between the task-irrelevant feature of stimulus location, and the task-relevant feature of 
response location (Hommel, 2009).  
 Combining feature overlap with the pattern-completion logic explains why people tend to 
over-attribute their own characteristics to people they perceive as similar to themselves, sometimes 
referred to as in-group bias. Imagine a colleague has the same educational background and shares a 
couple of physical features with you. Then perceiving or thinking of this person activates many 
features that are related to the self. Following pattern-completion, even more of the self-related 
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features become activated, which might lead you, rightfully or wrongly, to assume that the other 
person also loves cats.  
 The current work takes this a step further, and holds that not only relatively uncomplicated 
features are subject to over-attribution, but also higher-order mental capacities such as desires, goal-
directed behavior, and consciousness. These types of characteristics are typically construed as 
exclusively human, but can only ever be inferred. We thus propose that increased 
anthropomorphization follows increased overlap of task-relevant features.  
 This has serious implications. For instance, a male employer might choose to employ a 
similar-looking male over a female with the same or better résumé, simply because he can only 
imagine, or feature over-attribute, the male as possessing the required persistence and goal-
directedness he has himself. As another example, an athlete might unconsciously find another athlete 
more human than he finds a physically handicapped person, since he shares more physical and mental 
features with the former than the latter.  
 Solace may be found in the fact that this perception as more or less human isn't static: by 
altering the perceived similarity and/or the task-relevant dimensions, the task-relevant feature overlap 
changes and thereby the anthropomorphization of the other may change as well.  
 This means that the current account does not take anthropomorphization to be entirely static. 
Each individual has a baseline tendency to anthropomorphize, which may be high or low, but the 
actual level of anthropomorphization depends on the situation and the current perception of the target 
of anthropomorphization.  
 In addition to anthropomorphization being subject to variance, it also follows from this theory 
that the target of anthropomorphization does not necessarily have to be human, or even animal. As 
long as there are task-relevant features in common, there may be anthropomorphization.  
 In support of our theory, Morewedge, Preston and Wegner (2007) have found that when the 
speed of movement of a human, an animal, a robot, or an animated blob is closer to the average human 
speed, the target is anthropomorphized more. In terms of our proposed model, this means that when 
there is increased feature overlap between the movement of an observed agent and the self, there is 
increased over-attribution of self-related human-like features. This study would have provided 
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stronger support for our account if they had not only manipulated the speed of the targets and their 
surroundings, but also manipulated the speed of movement of the participant. If participants in that 
case anthropomorphized the target more if it was closer to their own manipulated speed, rather than 
the average human speed, there would be a clear indication of feature overlap at work.  
 Another study providing evidence for the importance of feature overlap found that when a 
gender-neutral robot talked in a human-like voice (but not when it talked in a robot-like voice) it was 
anthropomorphized more when the gender of the participant matched the gender of the voice, 
compared to when it was the opposite of the participant’s gender (Eyssel, Kuchenbrandt, Bobinger, de 
Ruiter, & Hegel, 2012).  
 Another study that lends support for the current theory reported that when a robot was 
presented as in-group, it was anthropomorphized and liked more than when it was presented as out-
group, both on implicit and explicit measures (Kuchenbrandt, Eyssel, Bobinger, & Neufeld, 2013). 
This study was the first to attempt an implicit measure of anthropomorphism. Participants were primed 
with either the picture of the robot or a picture of a computer, and then had to indicate whether a target 
word was a primary (e.g. happy) or secondary (e.g. hopeful) emotion, or no emotion at all. When the 
participants were told that they were in the same group as the robot, being primed with the robot 
coincided with quicker responses to secondary emotions, compared to being primed with the 
computer. Given that secondary emotions are construed as exclusively human (Leyens, Paladino, 
Rodríguez-Torres, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodríguez-Pérez, & Gaunt, 2000; Leyens, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, 
Gaunt, Paladino, Vaes, & Demoulin, 2001), the authors interpreted this as meaning that the in-group 
robot activated the concept “human”.  
 This study built on findings that in-group members are generally attributed more human-like 
qualities than out-group members. From the current perspective, both the general findings on in-group 
bias and those in their study can be explained by increased feature overlap between the self and the 
other, solely due to belonging to the same group.  
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The current study 
No study to date has considered the effect of task-relevant similarity manipulations on 
anthropomorphization. We aim to do so by having a human interact with a robot in the same 
dimension used to respond in a later task. The interaction entails making the same or different head 
movement from the other, and the subsequent computer task requires head movements for responses.  
  Synchronization.   Regarding imitation, numerous studies have looked into the 
effects of covert imitation on liking other people, but ours is the first study that transfers this to a 
robot. It has been found that individuals who synchronized their behavior felt more connected and 
thought the other was more similar to themselves (Valdesolo, Ouyang, & DeSteno, 2010); and that 
synchronized behavior led to increased similarity ratings, compassion, and a higher tendency to 
display altruistic behavior by helping the person that had been synchronized with (Valdesolo & 
DeSteno, 2011).  
We posit that similar changes will occur when the other is not a person, but a robot. This 
means that the effects are not exclusive to biological stimuli, but rather that they are based on 
perceived similarity between the self and any target.  
  Synchronization has been studied in a virtual reality setting (Ma, Lippelt, & Hommel, in press; 
Ma, Sellaro, Lippelt, & Hommel, 2016). It has been shown that synchronization not only induces 
ownership illusion of a virtual face, it also induces emotional contagion of the virtual face’s 
expression. This indicates that synchrony may indeed lead to increased perceived feature overlap. This 
study shows the other side of the coin: the features of the other seem to be attributed to the self.  
To find evidence for our theory, we designed a study in which participants performed three 
tasks after the manipulation of perceived task-relevant feature overlap: a joint Simon task, a one-shot 
Dictator game, and three questionnaires. Two of the questionnaires are aimed at measuring state 
anthropomorphization (Kozak et al., 2006; Epley et al., 2007 in Torta, Van Dijk, Ruijten, & Cuijpers 
2013), one of them is aimed at measuring trait anthropomorphization (Waytz et al., 2010), and this one 
will serve as baseline measure. 
  The Dictator Game.  Originally a method in experimental economics (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986), the Dictator Game is one of the economic games used to study fairness, 
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rejection, and altruism among other things (List, 2007). In the Dictator Game, one person is the 
“dictator” who decides how a given amount of money will be distributed between him or herself and 
another player. The other player has no choice but to accept the proposed distribution, hence the term 
“dictator”.  
 The setup of the current study is not a competitive one. The participant and robot engage in a 
joint Simon task and synchronization manipulation together. Therefore, the robot may be seen as a 
collaborator. Ben-Ner and Kramer (2011) have shown that collaborators are given higher stakes 
compared to neutral and competitive opponents. However counterintuitive it might be to give a robot 
money (after all, what is it going to use it for?), there is every chance that the robot will be given a part 
of the stake. In fact, it has been demonstrated that people are not entirely reluctant to give money to 
robots (de Kleijn, Van Es, Kachergis, & Hommel, submitted; Torta et al., 2013).  
Given that Valdesolo & DeSteno (2011) found that synchronization promotes altruism, it is 
likely that people will become more generous after a manipulation of this kind. We intend to test this 
by having participants play a one-shot Dictator Game with the robot. We expect that people will be 
more generous after synchronous compared to nonsynchronous interaction with the robot.  
  The joint Simon task.  The joint Simon task is a variation of the regular Simon task. 
In the regular Simon task (Craft & Simon, 1970; Simon, 1990), one person has to respond to two 
different stimuli with an according left or right button press. The stimuli are presented either to the left 
or the right of a fixation cross, and it has been demonstrated repeatedly that when the correct response 
to a stimulus presented on the right side of the fixation cross is a right button press, reaction time is 
shorter compared to when the stimulus is presented on the left side of the fixation cross. These two 
conditions are referred to as congruent and incongruent, respectively, and the difference in reaction 
time between the two conditions is called the Simon effect.  
 Sebanz, Knoblich, and Prinz (2003) first introduced the joint, or social, Simon task. In this 
version, one participant responds to one of the stimuli with a left button press, and the other responds 
to the other stimulus with a right button press. This essentially renders it a go-nogo task: when the 
stimulus you’ve been assigned to respond to comes up, regardless of its location, you press the one 
button that has been assigned to you. When this version is performed by a single person, so that one of 
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the stimuli remains unattended, the Simon effect is gone. Strikingly, when this task is performed by 
two people, the Simon effect returns.  
 Initially explained by co-representation of the other’s instructions (Sebanz, 2003), the joint 
Simon effect has since been replicated in other situations that make a co-representational interpretation 
unlikely. Specifically, it has been shown that the joint Simon effect persists when the “co-actor” is 
present but entirely passive (Dolk, Hommel, Colzato, Schütz-Bosbach, Prinz & Liepelt, 2010), 
indicating that even though there were no instructions to represent, there was interference. In addition, 
the rapport between co-actors has been shown to modulate the joint Simon effect, so that the joint 
Simon effect disappears with disliked co-actors (intimidating, competitive), and is preserved when the 
co-actor is friendly and cooperative (Hommel, Colzato, & Van den Wildenberg, 2009).  
 The co-actor need, in fact, not even be human. A joint Simon effect has been demonstrated 
with a wooden hand as “co-actor” after watching a video fragment of Pinocchio (Müller, Brass, Kühn, 
Tsai, Nieuwboer, Dijksterhuis, & Van Baaren, 2011). This is in line with our idea that the target need 
not be biological, and that anthropomorphization of the co-actor can lead to a joint Simon effect.  
 Our proposal for the mechanism by which a joint Simon effect may occur with a robot is in 
line with the referential coding account (Dolk, Hommel, Colzato, Schütz-Bosbach, Prinz, & Liepelt 
2014). Increased perceived similarity not only leads to over-attribution of one’s own features to the 
other, it also increased the necessity to distinguish between yourself and the other. Location is a 
reliable feature to distinguish yourself from others, after all, any place can only be occupied by one 
person at a time. Thus, to distinguish yourself from the other, the weight of the feature ‘location’ is 
increased. This results in overlap between one task-irrelevant feature, stimulus location, and another 
supposedly task-irrelevant feature, location of the response or responder. Therefore, the Simon effect 
resurfaces.  
 There has been one study in which a joint Simon task has been combined with a humanoid 
robot (Stenzel, Chinellato, Tirado Bou, Del Pobil, Lappe, & Liepelt, 2012). Participants were either 
told the robot was programmed in a “purely deterministic way”, or that it was programmed in a 
“biologically inspired, autonomous way”. The Simon effect was larger in the latter case. It seems that 
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believing a robot’s functionality is the same as what most humans consider to be true for them is 
enough perceived feature overlap to elicit a joint Simon effect.  
 In sum, we are interested in studying the effect of synchronization on implicit and explicit 
evaluations of a robot. We expect that synchronous, compared to nonsynchronous, interaction will 
result in increased perceived task-relevant feature overlap, which will lead to higher 
anthropomorphization scores, higher stakes offered in the Dictator Game, and a larger joint Simon 
effect.  
 
Methods 
Participants  
For this study, 53 participants were recruited (34 female), most of which (35) were Leiden University 
students. They were recruited through adverts, word of mouth, and via e-mail invitations. The mean 
age was 23.3 years old (total range: 19-30). Inclusion criteria were: healthy adults between 18-30 years 
of age with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Exclusion criteria were: autism spectrum disorder 
and the use of psychoactive medication. All participants were given monetary compensation for their 
time and efforts.  
 
Design  
The study comprised a 2 x 2 mixed design, with synchronicity as within-subjects factor (synchronous / 
nonsynchronous), and initiator as between subjects factor (human initiator / robot initiator). 
Participants had to complete two sessions of 60 minutes. During one of the sessions, the instructions 
were to act in synchrony, i.e. to copy the other’s head movements. In the other session, the instructions 
were to act nonsynchronously, i.e. to move the head in any way except how the other is moving it. The 
order of the conditions was counterbalanced to control for the effect of exposure to the robot.  
The sample was divided into two groups. For one half of the participants, the human was the 
initiator of the movements, for the other half of the participants, the robot was the initiator. This 
distinction was made because it was thought that there may be differential effects depending on who 
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initiates the movement. No specific direction was predicted. Assignment to conditions and group was 
performed using http://www.randomization.com/.  
 The study was single-blind: the experiment leader was aware of the condition the participant 
was in. This was deemed unavoidable due to the novelty of the procedure and the necessity of the 
experimenter to observe the procedure to ensure it being followed correctly. This could only be 
accomplished by knowing which movements were required according to the current condition.  
 
Measurements 
  Joint Simon task. The joint Simon task was presented on a 21-inch monitor. Each trial 
started with a fixation cross, presented for 500 milliseconds. After this, a blue or a red solid square 
was presented at either the left or the right of a fixation cross until a response was recorded. 
Depending on the session’s instructions either the robot or the participant had to respond to the 
stimulus by turning his/her head to either the left or the right (color and side were counterbalanced). 
Following the response, the next trial was initiated. The participant wore an InterSense InertiaCube4 
motion tracker stitched to a cap worn by the participant, which recorded the response onset in relation 
to the stimulus onset.  
 Participants first completed a practice block of 8 trials, followed by 4 blocks of 64 trials, 
which made for 256 recorded trials in total.  
 Based on our theory, we predicted the joint Simon effect, i.e. the difference in reaction time 
between congruent and incongruent trials, to be larger following synchronous, compared to 
nonsynchronous, movements, regardless of who initiated the movement. 
  Dictator Game . After the joint Simon Task, participants performed a one-shot Dictator 
Game with the robot as the opponent. They were presented with a stake, which could be 2, 5, 8, 10, or 
20 euros, and they were asked to decide how much of this stake, if any, they would want to give to the 
robot. The opponent has no say in this game, (s)he has to accept the distribution. The stakes were 
varied to control for size, and the outcome measure was the proportion of the stake participants were 
willing to give to the robot.  
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 Based on our theory, we predicted participants to give the robot a higher proportion of the 
stake in the synchronous, compared to the nonsynchronous, condition, regardless of who was the 
initiator of the to-be-copied behavior.  
  Questionnaires. At the end of both sessions, participants were asked to fill out three 
questionnaires: the Individual Differences in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire (IDAQ; Waytz, 
Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010) to assess trait anthropomorphization; the Mind Attribution Scale (MAS, 
Kozak, Marsh, & Wegner, 2006) to assess state anthropomorphization; and another state 
anthropomorphization scale taken from Torta et al. (2013), which is based on Epley, Waytz, and 
Cacioppo (2007; henceforth: Torta state questionnaire). The questionnaires aimed at assessing state 
anthropomorphism were modified to be about the robot, TheCorpora’s QBo rather than “your 
opponent” or “this person”. All questionnaires were answered on a 7-point Likert scale.  
 Participants completed all questionnaires in both sessions. The trait questionnaire answers 
were combined for a more reliable trait score. After the second session, participants answered five 
open questions that would give us insight into their experience.  
 Based on our theory we predicted that participants would exhibit a higher state 
anthropomorphization score in the synchronous, compared to the nonsynchronous condition, 
regardless of who was the initiator of the to-be-copied movements.   
Furthermore, we expected trait anthropomorphization to affect the magnitude of the joint 
Simon Effect, the generosity in the Dictator Game, and state anthropomorphization. Specifically, those 
with lower trait anthropomorphization scores would have a smaller joint Simon effect, lower 
generosity in the Dictator Game and lower state anthropomorphization scores in both sessions 
compared to those with higher trait anthropomorphization scores.  
 
Manipulation  
In one of the two sessions, participants synchronized with the robot, in the other (order 
counterbalanced) the participants desynchronized with the robot. For half of the participants, the robot 
was the initiator of the movements, with the participant as the follower. The other half of the 
participants was the initiator themselves, with the robot as the follower. This brought forth four 
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scenarios: (I) human initiator, synchronous condition; (II) human initiator, nonsynchronous condition; 
(III) robot initiator, synchronous condition; and (IV) robot initiator, nonsynchronous condition. In 
scenario (I), the participant was instructed to start making movements with his or her head, left and 
right at various speeds and to various degrees, which the robot would then copy. This copying was 
accomplished by use of a motion tracker sewn onto a cap that the participant wore throughout the 
session, which communicated with the computer that controlled the robot’s movement.   
In scenario (II), the participant was instructed to make any of those movements with his/her 
head, and the robot would move its head randomly at the same time. In scenario (III), the participant 
was instructed to copy exactly the head movements that the robot made. In scenario (IV), the 
participant was instructed to avoid moving his/her head in the exact way the robot was at the time the 
robot was making the movement. It was stressed that in the nonsynchronous condition, they shouldn’t 
make the exact opposite of the robot’s movements, as that is really just like copying.  
At the start of each session, the participant and robot practiced both the synchronous and 
nonsynchronous movements for half a minute, so the participant could experience what the alternative 
was like. Subsequently they performed the manipulation that belonged to their current condition for 
four minutes. After every block of 64 trials in the joint Simon task, the manipulation was repeated for 
two minutes to ensure that the effect did not wear off.  
 
The robot 
For this experiment, TheCorpora’s QBo was used. In scenarios (II), (III), and (IV) the robot received 
instructions from the computer controlling it for randomly determined movements. The motion 
tracker’s data was disregarded in these scenarios. For scenario (I), the computer controlling the robot 
received input from the motion tracker, which was translated for the robot to mirror the motion the 
participant made.  
 During the Simon Task, at the start of every trial to which the robot was to respond, a message 
was sent from the experiment computer (E-Prime) to the robot computer (Linux) to initiate the 
appropriate response shortly after stimulus onset. There was no variation in response latency, and there 
were no pre-programmed erroneous responses, although there was a sporadic miscommunication 
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between the computers leading the robot to not respond for a trial. The number of trials to which the 
robot failed to respond was not recorded.  
 
Procedure   
The current investigation was a two-session, 2 x 2 mixed design study, with synchronicity as within-
subjects factor and initiator as between-subjects factor. The initiator of the to-be-followed behavior is 
fixed between subjects such that half of the participants attended to the robot’s head movement in both 
sessions, whereas the other half was the initiator of the head movements in both sessions. In one of the 
sessions, the participant and robot acted in synchrony. In the other session, they acted 
nonsynchronously.  
Upon arrival in the first session, participants were informed about the study they were about to 
take part in verbally and by means of an information letter. If they gave their consent, they were taken 
into the room with the one-way mirror, where the experiment took place. The mirror was used to 
monitor that the robot and the program were functioning appropriately, not to observe the participant’s 
behavior. Participants were informed of this, so as to minimize any effects of observation. In both 
sessions, participants started with a practice session of the synchronization manipulation as explained 
in the section Manipulation, followed by four minutes of the manipulation. After this, they received 
instructions for the joint Simon task and went through an 8 trial practice block. Thereafter they started 
on the joint Simon task, with repeats of the manipulation after every block. Finally, they filled out the 
trait and state anthropomorphism questionnaires, and after the second session they filled out some 
additional questions about their experience of the experiment, which was followed by their payment.   
 
Results 
Data preparation  
Before analysis, the data were prepared and filtered in the following way. For the questionnaires, the 
points for each question were added to form a total score. This resulted in six scores: synchronous and 
nonsynchronous scores for Torta (state), MAS (state) and IDAQ (trait). The synchronous and 
nonsynchronous IDAQ trait scores were combined and averaged, and the resulting score was used in 
14 
 
further analyses. A composite score of the Torta and MAS questionnaires was used in analyses since 
that is a better indicator of the underlying state. The Dictator Game (DG) offer was coded as a 
proportion of the total stake, which was used for further analyses. For the joint Simon task, all RTs 
between 100 – 1100 milliseconds were taken into account. The lower threshold was chosen based on 
minimal realistic response time; anything under 100 milliseconds must be an error. The higher 
threshold was chosen based on how long Simon stimuli are usually presented on the screen before the 
next trial commences. The median RT was used for further analyses, as this is the preferred measure of 
central tendency for RTs due to its insensitivity to skewed distributions.  
 
Clustered bootstrap 
The data of the DG, the Torta questionnaire, and the joint Simon task did not meet the assumption of 
normally distributed residuals and therefore, the intended RM ANOVAs could not be performed. A 
log transformation did not sufficiently eliminate this problem. Therefore, a clustered bootstrap was 
chosen as the best alternative.  
To prepare the data for the bootstrap, age and IDAQ trait score were centered. For each 
participant, the median congruent RT was subtracted from the median incongruent RT per condition, 
resulting in a synchronous and nonsynchronous Simon effect value for each participant. Then, for each 
outcome measure, a clustered bootstrap of 10,000 random samples with replacement was performed 
following De Rooij (2013). This method provides linear regression coefficients for each of the 
predictor variables for each sample, and renders a coefficient estimate and 95% confidence interval for 
each predictor based on its distribution over the samples. Whenever the confidence interval for a 
predictor’s regression coefficient does not contain 0, it has a significant effect upon the outcome 
measure. Since the applied method does not provide bias-corrected and accelerated confidence 
intervals, histograms of all coefficients were checked to make sure the parameter estimates were 
normally distributed, before looking at the results.  
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Torta state anthropomorphization 
To test whether the robot was explicitly anthropomorphized more after synchronous compared to 
nonsynchronous interaction with the robot according to the Torta state questionnaire, a clustered 
bootstrap was performed on a model with IDAQ mean trait score, initiator, synchronicity, and initiator 
x synchronicity as predictors, and Torta score as predicted value. IDAQ mean trait was the only 
significant predictor (β = 0.253, 95% CI [0.142, 0.358]). It can be seen in Figure 1 that there was 
variation between the two sessions, but this was not significant (see Table 2 for full results).  
 This means that what is measured with the Torta anthropomorphization scale was not affected 
by our synchronicity manipulation, but is only affected by people’s baseline tendency to 
anthropomorphize. The higher participants’ baseline tendency to anthropomorphize was, the higher 
their Torta state score.  
 
Mind Attribution Scale state anthropomorphization  
To test whether the robot was explicitly anthropomorphized more after synchronous compared to 
nonsynchronous interaction with the robot according to the MAS questionnaire, a clustered bootstrap 
was performed on a model with IDAQ mean trait score, initiator, synchronicity, and initiator x 
synchronicity as predictors, and MAS score as predicted value. There were two significant predictors: 
IDAQ mean trait (β = 0.425, 95% CI [0.196, 0.648]), and synchronicity (β = 2.335, 95% CI [0.162, 
4.505]).  
 This means that in addition to participants’ baseline tendency to anthropomorphize, 
synchronicity affected the MAS state score as well. Higher IDAQ trait score predicted higher MAS 
score, similar to its effect on the Torta questionnaire. But countering our expectations, participants 
scored higher on this measure of state anthropomorphization following the nonsynchronous (M = 
28.42, SD = 9.23), compared to the synchronous (M = 27.15, SD = 9.07), condition. As evidenced in 
the graph (Figure 2), this was particularly pronounced in the human initiator group.  
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Joint Simon effect 
To test whether the difference in response time following congruent compared to incongruent trials 
(Simon effect) was larger after synchronous compared to nonsynchronous interaction, a clustered 
bootstrap was performed on a model with IDAQ mean trait score, Torta state score, MAS state score, 
initiator, synchronicity, and initiator x synchronicity as predictors, and joint Simon effect (JSE) value 
as predicted value. There were three significant predictors. The MAS state score (β = 0.970, 95% CI 
[0.067, 1.844]) was a significant predictor with a positive coefficient. This means that the higher the 
participant scored on the MAS, the larger the JSE. The Torta state score (β = -3.134, 95% CI [-4.941,  
-1.379]) on the other hand, turned out to be a negative predictor, so the higher participants scored on 
that questionnaire, the smaller the JSE.  
  Finally, the synchronicity x initiator interaction was a significant predictor (β = 18.356, 95% 
CI [3.037, 33.269]). A follow-up bootstrap showed that this effect was due to a significant difference 
in JSE scores for the robot initiator group, who had a larger JSE in the nonsynchronous (M = 20.21, 
SD = 30.67) compared to the synchronous (M = 5.58, SD = 19.43, see Table 1) condition. This was not 
consistent with our hypotheses.   
In order to explore why the two state questionnaires had opposing effects, a score was 
computed for each participant comprising only the MAS items that were distinct from the Torta items 
(“QBo has a good memory”, “QBo can engage in a great deal of thought”, and “QBo is capable of 
planned actions”). It was thought that perhaps the two questionnaires measured something different 
due to these items, thus explaining the differential effects upon JSE. Correlations between the resulting 
score and the Torta questionnaire were however still significant (r (100) = .489, p < .01), though the 
correlation was weaker compared to the correlation between the total MAS score and the Torta 
questionnaire (r (100) = .770, p < .01). There was, therefore, insufficient evidence for the two 
questionnaires measuring something distinct.  
Another clustered bootstrap was performed adding the interactions Torta x MAS and Torta x 
MAS x synchronicity to test whether there was a significant difference between the coefficients of the 
questionnaires that could help explain their opposing effects. Neither of the coefficients were 
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significant (Torta x MAS: β = -0.095, 95% CI [-3.021, 1.689]; Torta x MAS x synchronicity: (β = -
0.034, 95% CI [-0.287, 0.242]) 
 
Dictator Game  
To test whether a higher proportion of the stake was offered following synchronous compared to 
nonsynchronous interaction with the robot, a clustered bootstrap was performed on a model with 
IDAQ mean trait score, Torta state score, MAS state score, initiator, synchronicity, and initiator x 
synchronicity as predictors, and Dictator Game offer as predicted value. There was one significant 
predictor, initiator (β = -0.123, 95% CI [-0.264, -0.006]), which indicated that those in the robot 
initiator group gave smaller proportions to the robot (robot initiator: M = 0.28, SD = 0.27; human 
initiator: M = 0.31, SD = 0.27, see Table 1).  
 Though not significant, there appears to be an interaction between synchronicity and initiator 
(Figure 4), that follows the same pattern as the JSE (Figure 3).  
 
Discussion 
This study investigated whether anthropomorphization of a robot could be influenced by a 
manipulation of task-relevant perceived similarity, combining explicit measures (questionnaires) with 
implicit measures (Dictator Game and joint Simon task). We predicted that the robot would be 
anthropomorphized more following synchronous behavior compared to nonsynchronous behavior. 
Overall, the results did not confirm our hypotheses.  
Both the Torta and the Mind Attribution Scale state anthropomorphization questionnaire 
showed the same pattern of results: the robot was rated more human-like in the nonsynchronous 
compared to the synchronous condition, opposing our prediction. This effect was most pronounced in 
the group where the human was the initiator of the to-be-copied movements, whereas the group in 
which the robot initiated the to-be-copied movement displayed less of a difference. The effect of 
synchronicity condition was significant only for the MAS.  
A possible explanation for this result, specifically in the human initiator group, is that rather 
than increasing perceived feature overlap, the robot was regarded as executing a simplistic computer 
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action by imitating the human’s behavior. From this perspective, the robot shows unexpected behavior 
in the nonsynchronous condition, being that it does not copy the human’s behavior. Unexpectedness is 
hypothesized by Epley et al. (2007) to lead to more anthropomorphization. If it was indeed the case 
that the robot’s movements seemed unexpected in the nonsynchronous condition —perhaps even 
coming from its own will—the robot could have therefore been rated higher on the anthropomorphism 
scales.  
 The joint Simon effect was larger in the nonsynchronous condition for the robot initiator 
group, and did not significantly differ for the human initiator group. The effect in the robot initiator 
group may be explained by participants’ reported difficulty with the synchronicity manipulation. 
Many participants reported that they found it difficult both to monitor what movements the robot was 
making and to think of what they were doing to be sure it was different from the robot’s movements. 
Possibly, this was a heavier burden on their cognitive resources than anticipated, which may have led 
to a more pronounced congruency effect (much like sleep deprivation depletes resources, leading to an 
increased Simon effect, Bratzke , Steinborn, Rolke, & Ulrich, 2012). 
 We had not anticipated that the two state anthropomorphization questionnaires would have 
opposing effects upon the JSE. Possibly, there is an interaction with another (latent) variable that 
would explain it. However, as this was not hypothesized in advance, this was not further analyzed.   
 An interesting finding was that the pattern of results for the Dictator Game and the joint Simon 
effect was similar, although the interaction between condition and group was not significant in the 
former. To specify, for both measures, the human initiator group had a higher score (proportion 
offered and joint Simon Effect respectively) in the synchronous condition, but the robot initiator group 
had a higher score in the nonsynchronous condition. The similarity may indicate that the same process 
has been affected. Further research could illuminate this.  
 Where do the results leave our proposed theory? Obviously, the current results provide no 
evidence for the mechanism as we proposed it. However, it is possible that the hypothesized 
mechanism was actually at work on the implicit level in the human initiator group, but methodological 
shortcomings have prevented us from properly supporting it. Consider the pattern of results for the 
group in which the human initiated the movements. For both the Dictator Game and the joint Simon 
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task it appears the direction was as predicted: larger JSE and higher proportion offered in the 
synchronous compared to the nonsynchronous condition. This was, as mentioned, not significant. But 
future studies with methodological improvements (e.g. synchronicity manipulation that equally taxes 
cognitive resources in all conditions; studying only a human initiator group; more trials or 
participants) could elaborate on this to see whether or not there may be something to it after all.  
 It is clear, however, that the proposed mechanism does not work on the explicit level. The 
questionnaire scores clearly indicated that anthropomorphization was higher following 
nonsynchronous compared to synchronous movements. It would be interesting to further study 
whether that is indeed related to the unexpectedness of the robot’s behavior.  
To conclude, it can be said that interaction with a robot in task-relevant dimensions alters 
implicit and explicit perception of it, and it does so in different ways depending on the level of 
measurement (implicit or explicit), and on who initiated the to-be-copied movements.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Initiator  Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Human 
MAS state 
Nonsynchronous   28.63   9.32   10.00   51.00 
Synchronous   26.30   9.93   10.00   47.00 
Torta state 
Nonsynchronous     8.81   4.40      5.00   22.00 
Synchronous     8.07   3.59      5.00   17.00 
IDAQ mean trait 
Nonsynchronous   47.33 11.69   24.00   66.00 
Synchronous   45.70 10.77   28.00   69.00 
Total    46.52 10.82   26.00   67.50 
Dictator Game offer 
Nonsynchronous     0.29   0.26      0.00     0.80 
Synchronous     0.33   0.28      0.00     1.00 
Response time 
congruent 
Nonsynchronous 422.67 65.39 281.00 547.00 
Synchronous 427.54 56.60 352.00 576.00 
Response time 
incongruent 
Nonsynchronous 436.15 75.42 289.00 570.00 
Synchronous 443.94 68.61 350.00 570.00 
Joint Simon effect 
Nonsynchronous   13.48 21.77  -28.00   80.50 
Synchronous   16.41 31.71  -27.00   82.00 
Robot 
MAS state 
Nonsynchronous   28.19   9.30   10.00   50.00 
Synchronous   28.04   8.18   15.00   46.00 
Torta state 
Nonsynchronous     8.96   5.24      5.00   24.00 
Synchronous     8.69   4.32      5.00   20.00 
IDAQ mean trait 
Nonsynchronous   46.46   8.81   30.00   66.00 
Synchronous   48.42   7.63   30.00   65.00 
Total    47.44   7.89   30.00   65.00 
Dictator Game offer 
Nonsynchronous     0.32   0.31      0.00     1.00 
Synchronous     0.24   0.23      0.00     0.50 
Response time 
congruent 
Nonsynchronous 436.92 58.18 367.00 562.00 
Synchronous 425.92 60.64 369.00 570.00 
Response time 
incongruent 
Nonsynchronous 457.13 58.73 352.00 582.00 
Synchronous 431.50 58.70 371.00 570.00 
Joint Simon effect 
Nonsynchronous   20.21 30.67  -19.00   99.00 
Synchronous     5.58 19.43  -58.00   51.00 
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Table 2. Coefficients and confidence intervals from the clustered bootstrap analyses 
 Parameter estimate 
Confidence interval 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Joint Simon 
effect 
Intercept 22.366     4.507 41.809 
IDAQ mean trait   0.509    -0.229   1.271 
MAS state      0.970*     0.067   1.844 
Torta state    -3.134*    -4.941  -1.379 
Initiator (0 = human; 1= robot) -12.378 -25.652   1.265 
Synchronicity (0 = synchronous; 1= 
nonsynchronous)  -2.915 -12.568   6.938 
Initiator x synchronicity   18.356*     3.037 33.269 
Dictator Game 
offer 
Intercept   0.143   -0.092   0.364 
IDAQ mean trait   0.000   -0.008   0.008 
MAS state   0.003   -0.006   0.013 
Torta state   0.015   -0.006   0.037 
Initiator (0 = human; 1= robot)    -0.129*   -0.264  -0.006 
Synchronicity (0 = synchronous; 1 = 
nonsynchronous)  -0.057   -0.151   0.034 
Initiator x synchronicity   0.132   -0.003   0.270 
Torta state 
Intercept   8.110     6.493   9.825 
IDAQ mean trait     0.253*     0.142   0.358 
Initiator (0 = human; 1= robot)   0.359   -1.532   2.126 
Synchronicity (0 = synchronous; 1 = 
nonsynchronous)   0.741   -0.274   1.755 
Initiator x synchronicity  -0.472   -1.849   0.907 
MAS state 
Intercept 26.414   21.995 30.998 
IDAQ mean trait      0.425*     0.196   0.648 
Initiator (0 = human; 1= robot)   1.135   -3.303   5.412 
Synchronicity (0 = synchronous; 1 = 
nonsynchronous)     2.336*     0.162   4.505 
Initiator x synchronicity  -2.182   -5.311   0.952 
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Figure 2. Mind Attribution Scale anthropomorphization score per condition, split by group. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. Mostly the human initiator group appeared to score higher in the 
asynchronous condition. However, only the effect of condition, not the interaction with group, was 
significant. This means that overall, the robot was anthropomorphized more in the asynchronous condition.  
Figure 2. Torta state anthropomorphization score per condition, split by group. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. Both groups scored higher in the asynchronous condition. The difference between 
conditions was, however, not significant.  
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Figure 3. Difference in reaction time in congruent vs incongruent trials (Simon effect) for each condition, 
split by group. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The interaction between group and condition 
was significant, and further testing revealed that for the robot initiator group, there was a significantly 
larger JSE in the asynchronous condition compared to the synchronous condition.  
Figure 4. Proportion offered in the Dictator Game per condition, split by group. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. The interaction between group and condition was not significant, but the effect of 
group was. This means that those in the robot initiator group overall gave lower offers to the robot.  
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Appendix 
1. Anthropomorphism questionnaires 
1.1 IDAQ, Waytz, Cacioppo & Epley, 2010 (trait) 
To what extent is the desert lethargic (sleepy, lazy)?  
To what extent is the average computer active? 
To what extent does technology (devices and machines for manufacturing, entertainment, 
and productive processes) have intentions?  
To what extent does the average fish have free will? 
To what extent is the average cloud good-looking? 
To what extent are pets useful?  
To what extent does the average mountain have free will? 
To what extent is the average amphibian lethargic (sleepy, lazy)? 
To what extent does a television experience emotions?  
To what extent is the average robot good-looking? 
To what extent does the average robot have consciousness? 
To what extent do cows have intentions?  
To what extent does a car have free will? 
To what extent does the ocean have consciousness? 
To what extent is the average camera lethargic (sleepy, lazy)? 
To what extent is a river useful? 
To what extent does the average computer have a mind of its own (the ability to make its 
own decisions)? 
To what extent is a tree active? 
To what extent is the average kitchen appliance useful? 
To what extent does a cheetah experience emotions? 
To what extent does the environment experience emotions? 
To what extent does the average insect have a mind of its own (the ability to make its own 
decisions)? 
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To what extent does a tree have a mind of its own (the ability to make its own decisions)? 
To what extent is technology (devices and machines for manufacturing, entertainment and 
productive processes) durable (duurzaam) 
To what extent is the average cat active? 
To what extent does the wind have intentions? 
To what extent is the forest durable (duurzaam)? 
To what extent is a tortoise durable (duurzaam)? 
To what extent does the average reptile have consciousness? 
To what extent is the average dog good-looking? 
Response options: Not at all – A tiny bit – A bit – Some – Quite a bit – A lot – Very 
much. 
 
1.2 Anthropomorphism scale by Epley 2007, taken from Van Dijk, 2013 (state). Modified to 
fit our study. 
Overall, do you believe QBo is capable of feeling emotions? 
Overall, do you believe QBo is capable of having intentions? 
Overall, do you believe QBo has consciousness? 
Overall, do you believe QBo has a mind of his own? 
Overall, do you believe QBo has free will? 
Response options: Not at all – A tiny bit – A bit – Some – Quite a bit – A lot – Very 
much. 
 
1.3 Mind Attribution Scale, Kozak, Marsh & Wegner, 2006. Modified to fit our study. 
QBo has complex feelings 
QBo can experience pain 
QBo is capable of emotion 
QBo can experience pleasure 
QBo is capable of doing things on purpose 
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QBo is capable of planned actions 
QBo has goals 
QBo is highly conscious 
QBo has a good memory 
QBo can engage in a great deal of thought 
Response options: Strongly disagree – Mostly disagree – Somewhat disagree – Neutral – 
Somewhat agree – Mostly agree – Strongly agree. 
1.4 Debriefing questions (open questions) 
What do you think we are trying to study? (Hypothesis) 
Have you participated in any other robot or virtual reality experiments? If so, will you 
please briefly tell us when, how often, and what kind? 
What did you think of QBo, our robot, when you first saw him? 
What do you think of QBo now? 
Do you have any remarks, or things you'd like to tell/ask us about our study? 
 
